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ABSTRACT 
Since the 2001 anthrax attacks, communities have been responding to a sample surge of 
suspicious mailings. Each event has the potential to be an act of bioterrorism involving a 
deadly pathogen and, thus, requires a timely response in order to evaluate the risk to 
public safety. Stakeholders from federal and state governments and industry have 
recognized the need to develop a mission capability for responding to these suspicious 
events.  The framework for a biothreat field response mission capability advocates the 
use of innovative detection technology in support of a risk assessment concept of 
operation. Implementing the framework will require federal and state collaboration and 
will establish local certification training standards, field-based proficiency and 
competency assessment exercises, and state response plans that reflect national guidance. 
This research describes the critical elements of a bioresponse framework, the current 
status of framework adoption at the state level, and recommendations for a three-phased 
implementation model. 
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Emergency responders1 in the United States respond to suspicious substances and 
packages as a matter of routine. Since the 2001 anthrax attacks, law enforcement 
agencies in the United States have responded to over 30,000 suspect events.2 Each event 
required a law enforcement investigation, sample collection by a qualified hazardous 
materials (HAZMAT)3 team, and laboratory analysis to clear the suspected material of 
being hazardous. Each event was initiated through a public complaint, resulting in 
varying levels of social and economic disruption, and caused uncertainty in the minds of 
those directly related with the on-scene response. A sample surge phenomena has become 
the legacy of the post-9/11 era. Nearly all of the 30,000-plus suspicious substance events 
since then were found not to be acts of terrorism, but nonetheless they did create 
significant disruption, public fear and economic damage.4 Rarely do these incidents 
involve real hazards, and sometimes they turn out to be nothing more than a practical 
joke. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) treats these incidents as real events and 
will prosecute the senders if they can be arrested.5 Regardless of the low probability of an 
actual biological threat incident, emergency responders and law enforcement must react 
                                                 
1 An “emergency responder” includes state, local, and tribal emergency public safety, law 
enforcement, emergency response, emergency medical (including hospital emergency facilities), and 
related personnel, agencies, and authorities. See Section 2 (6), Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-
296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). ASTM International, E2770-10: Standard Guide for Operational Guidelines 
for Initial Response to a Suspected Biothreat Agent (West Conshohocken, PA: ASTM International, 2010), 
3, retrieved May 10, 2012, from http://www.astm.org/DHS/E2770.pdf.  
2 Department of Homeland Security, Framework for Biothreat Field Response Mission Capability, 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2011), 3. 
3 A “HAZMAT responder” is a trained and certified individual who is a member of a hazardous 
material response team or qualified to respond to incidents involving toxic industrial chemicals, chemical 
warfare agents and other weapons of mass destruction, or both. A HAZMAT response specialist will have 
additional training to respond to specific weapons of mass destruction. ASTM International, E2770-10: 
Standard Guide for Operational Guidelines, 3. 
4 Fox News, “White Powder Case Costs Millions in First Response,” Fox News, May 17, 2012, 
retrieved August 13, 2013, from http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/05/17/white-powder-case-costs-
millions-in-first-response/. 
5 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Reward Offered in White Powder Letters Case,” Federal Bureau of 
Investigation News Blog, May 16, 2012, http://www.fbi.gov/news/news_blog/white-powder-
letters_051612. 
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to each event with the potential for the suspect material or package to be a weapon of 
mass destruction (WMD). The potential for catastrophe requires that a timely deployment 
of a biothreat response mission capability to determine the true threat and hazard of each 
event.   
Following the anthrax attacks in Florida, Washington, D.C., and New York the 
sample surge phenomena increased so rapidly that emergency responders and the 
laboratories that could handle biological samples for the federal government were quickly 
overwhelmed with the sheer volume of incidents. At that time, there were no validated 
methods or a coordinated concept of operations (ConOp) to aid in sample collection.6 
Competing concerns over public health and law enforcement objectives complicated 
emergency responder actions even more. Often, environmental samples were consumed 
on-site in an attempt to make field identification with no material remaining for 
confirmatory analysis at a certified laboratory. Samples that did make it to a public health 
laboratory were typically described as “unusual and unusable.”7 In March 2005, the 
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report that was critical 
of the 2001 anthrax response,8 GAO-05-251, Anthrax Detection: Agencies Need to 
Validate Sampling Activities in Order to Increase Confidence in Negative Results. In the 
GAO’s view, “the lack of validation of agencies’ activities, coupled with limitations 
associated with their targeted sampling strategy, means that negative results may not be 
reliable.”9 The GAO went on to recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take 
on the task of ensuring that sample collection and pathogen detection methods are 
validated and to coordinate the different agencies’ efforts in environmental testing.10 
Although the focus of GAO-05-251 was not specifically on the on-site biological 
                                                 
6 Laurie Locascio, “Department of Homeland Security and Committee E54 Lead the Way,” last 
modified August 2006, ASTM International, retrieved June 18, 2013, from 
http://www.astm.org/SNEWS/AUGUST_2006/locascio_aug06.html.  
7 Ibid. 
8 United States Government Accountability Office [GAO], Anthrax Detection: Agencies Need to 
Validate Sampling Activities in Order to Increase Confidence in Negative Results (GAO-05-251), 
(Washington, DC: United States Government Accountability Office, 2005), retrieved July 21, 2013, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05251.pdf. 
9 Ibid., abstract.  
10 Ibid. 
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assessment and threat evaluation process conducted by emergency responders during the 
initial phase of recognition and response, the findings were relevant to these shareholder 
communities.  
The concerns in detection capability were identified again in 2008 in GAO-08-
180, First Responders’ Ability to Detect and Model Hazardous Releases in Urban Areas 
is Significantly Limited. GAO-08-180 differed from GAO-05-251 in that it was specific 
to emergency responders. That report stated, “Handheld detection devices for biological 
agents are not reliable or effective.”11 It also recognized that DHS has the primary 
mission to develop, independently test, and certify emergency responder detection 
equipment.12 The reports became a call to action; when the Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC), United States Postal Service (USPS), and the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) read the draft report, they all agreed that methods for detecting 
anthrax were not validated and that a systematic validation effort was needed.13 Over 
concerns from Congress regarding the suitability of handheld assays for field assessment, 
stakeholders from federal and state agencies participated in an interagency working group 
to define a framework in order to improve the reliability and accuracy of on-site testing 
results.14  
In May 2011, the White House released A National Strategy for CBRNE 
Standards.15 The document described the strategy for the adoption of national standards: 
To confidently prepare for and respond to CBRNE incidents, Federal, 
State, Local and tribal governments must be guided and supported by 
                                                 
11 United States Government Accountability Office [GAO], First Responders’ Ability to Detect and 
Model Hazardous Releases in Urban Areas is Significantly Limited (GAO-08-180) (Washington, DC: 
United States Government Accountability Office, 2008), retrieved July 21, 2013, from 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08180.pdf. 
12 Ibid., 26. 
13 Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, “GAO Questions Anthrax Detection Methods,” 
last modified April 18, 2005, Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, University of Minnesota, 
retrieved June 13, 2013, from 
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/bt/anthrax/news/april1805anthrax.html. 
14 Department of Homeland Security, Framework for Biothreat Field Response Mission Capability, 3. 
15 White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2010), 18, White House, 
retrieved May 10, 2012, from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 
 4
standards. Standards for CBRNE range from standards for equipment 
performance, interoperability, operating procedures, and training 
certification of responders, to the test and evaluation of CBRNE 
equipment.16  
Innovation and technology are changing how communities respond to suspicious 
powder events. Without integrated tools for assessing hazards, traditional response 
models are becoming outdated. As emergency responders have adapted to the increasing 
prevalence of the next generation of detection systems, such as real-time polymerase 
chain reaction (PCR), some communities are transforming their capabilities into mobile 
extensions of the traditional brick and mortar laboratory. Innovation has made it possible 
for emergency responders to produce on-scene assessments that were not possible pre-
9/11. If the national response frameworks does not take into account the prevalence of 
new technologies, it risks becoming outdated. Some agencies are reluctant to accept the 
utility of detectors because of limitations surrounding the quality of their results, which 
has led to challenges in developing a national framework that integrates innovative 
technology. For example, it is the position of the Association of Public Health 
Laboratories (APHL) to oppose the use of field-based detection because of issues 
surrounding the lack of standardization and validated performance.17 
In 2011, a national framework for biothreat response was published; it addresses 
the challenges of technology integration for detection technology and the need to 
standardize. The Framework for a Biothreat and Response Mission Capability18 is 
supported by five critical mission elements that enable coordination amongst responding 
agencies and confidence in assay results. The five elements are: 
 
 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Association of Public Health Laboratories, Standardized Validation of Screening Kits and Devices 
for Use in the Field to Identify Hazardous Biological and Chemical Agents, November 2006, Association 
of Public Health Laboratories, retrieved December 4, 2012, from 
http://www.aphl.org/policy/Documents/Field_Devices.pdf. 
18 Department of Homeland Security, Framework for Biothreat Field Response Mission Capability.  
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1. A concept of operations (ConOps) to support use of fielded assays and 
coordination of response among the key stakeholders in the jurisdiction;  
2. Training and certification of end-users;  
3. Proficiency testing in the hands of the end-user in the field;  
4. Sample collection and handling standards; and  
5. Assays that have been properly tested by a qualified third party and 
certified to meet or exceed appropriately recognized national voluntary 
consensus standards for performance.19  
The publication of ASTM E2770-10 met the first critical element, which pertains 
to the biothreat response ConOp.20 The ConOp defines the hazard assessment and threat 
evaluation process as HAZMAT and law enforcement responsibilities, respectively. The 
initial response is the point where technology can have the greatest impact on changing 
the way a suspect event is resolved. The ConOp defines the role for technology to 
facilitate the hazard assessment process.  
The second and third elements, certified training and field delivered proficiency 
testing, have not been accomplished at the national level, but some work has been 
accomplished at the state level that demonstrates these elements are achievable.  The 
fourth critical element, sample handling standards, was achieved through publication of 
ASTM E2458-10, which is a sample collection standard.21 The standard is a two-part 
method. “Method A” is for the collection of bulk powder and any accompanying letters, 
and “Method B” is for the collection of remaining trace residual powder. E2458-10 is a 
sample split method at point of sample.22 Method A is for a state’s public health 
laboratory, and method B is for on-site testing. E2458-10 marks a significant change in 
the national response doctrine for suspected biological threats because the method 
recognizes the need for on-site testing. Lastly, progress has been made on the fifth 
element, validated assays, through the development of national consensus performance 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 3. 
20 Ibid. 4. 
21 Ibid. 4. 
22 ASTM International, E2458-10: Standard Practices for Bulk Sample Collection and Swab 
Collection of Visible Powders Suspected of Being Biothreat Agents from Nonporous Surfaces (West 
Conshohocken, PA: ASTM International, 2010), retrieved May 10, 2012, from 
http://www.astm.org/DHS/E2458.pdf.  
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standards that define the minimum performance requirements for assays that evaluate 
suspicious powders for B. anthraces and ricin toxin in the field. 
The national framework goes on to define two field-based assays and one 
confirmatory assay. The first field-based assay is the “on-site biological assessment” or 
field safety screening.23 It is conducted at point of sample before the sample is collected. 
Screening results are used to support the hazard assessment, which is then combined with 
a law enforcement threat evaluation in order to determine an incident’s risk assessment. 
The risk assessment defines what actions should occur, or how the response should 
proceed, such as the need to collect and test a sample. Therefore, screening should 
accomplish two things: determination if the sample is safe to handle and base 
characterization of the sample. Currently, characterization screening is not an accepted 
part of the national framework, only safety screening. The need for characterization 
screening, which is a component of an “on-site biological assessment,”24 will be 
addressed later in this thesis and recommendations on how to incorporate results into the 
framework ConOp will be made in the Conclusion Section.  
The other field-based assay is the public safety actionable assay (PSAA), which is 
used to presumptively identify an unknown substance.25 Method B, or on-site samples, 
are for PSAA. PSAAs support public safety actions such as shutting down a facility, 
determining proper decontamination procedures, and other contamination control 
procedures. These are considered ascending protective actions. Under some very specific 
circumstances, PSAA can be used in determining descending protective actions, such as 
downgrading personal protective equipment ensembles. Negative PSAAs cannot be used 
to rule out the presence of all biological threats. Therefore, method A, or off-site samples, 
must be tested for confirmation by the laboratory response network (LRN) laboratory via 
the third type of assay, Public Health Actionable Assay (PHAA). PHAA are considered 
definitive and results can be used to support medical response and public messaging.   
                                                 
23 Department of Homeland Security, Framework for Biothreat Field Response Mission Capability, 5. 
24 An “on-site biological assessment” is a measurement of properties inherent to biological materials 
performed in the field using rapid, field based procedures, and assays. ASTM International. E2770-10: 
Standard Guide for Operational Guidelines, 3.  
25 For the purpose of this paper “PSAA” maybe interchangeable with “presumptive analysis.” 
 7
 
Figure 1.  Bioresponse ConOp 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The bioresponse framework was developed in reaction to the sample surge 
phenomena post-9/11. At its very core, the framework is a triage process to quickly and 
accurately evaluate the level of risk of a suspected event in order to determine how to 
proceed during the initial hours of a response. Technology is the driving force behind 
change, and it is unknown how local emergency responders are incorporating the 
technology into the ConOp. It is unknown how the framework will support emergency 
responder use of the technology in terms of quality assurance (QA), training and 
competency and proficiency assessment. 
The disruptive effects of integrating innovative technology can lead to 
evolutionary changes in response operations similar to what happened when the 
 8
emergency medical services (EMS) system was implemented in the late 1960s. In the 
EMS community, technology, methodologies, and credentialing transformed the 
ambulance from simple transport to an extension of the emergency room. Similarly, 
HAZMAT teams are also transforming, becoming the field response units for their state’s 
public health laboratory.26 Advances in portable detection, such as real-time PCR and 
lateral flow immunoassays, hold great potential to positively impact local preparedness 
levels.  
The demand for detection technology is growing rapidly as the nation experiences 
yet another round of biothreat mailings.27 It is unclear how many portable detectors are in 
use by emergency responders, but it is clear that equipment manufacturers are directly 
marketing to them.28 Detection capability at this level requires a ConOp and a QA 
program in order to standardize results and increase reliability.29 Without standards, 
communities will be left vulnerable to false positive and false negative results. 
Implementation of a standardized QA program will reduce the incidence of faulty results 
and increase preparedness. State governments and their public health laboratories do not 
have clear guidance on how to implement the national biothreat response framework. 
Due to “home-rule,” the federal government cannot direct implementation; like the EMS 
example, framework implementation must occur at the state and community levels. 30 It 
                                                 
26 Jayne Morrow, Clay McGuyer, Bryon Marsh, David Ladd, “Building a National Biothreat Response 
Capability,” Defense Standardization Program Journal (April/September 2012), 26.  
27 Paul Harris, “Bit-Part Actor Charged over Plot to Frame Husband for Ricin Letters,” The Guardian, 
June 8, 2013, retrieved July 21, 2013, from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/08/shannon-
richardson-ricin-plot-husband. 
28 A. Bird, D. Kadavy, A. Vinas, L. Allen, N. Westfall, R. Carrion, K. Hoosien, M. Redon, C. 
Christensen, J. Gardner, R. Trauscht, R., Crisp, D. Stordal, and J. Nunneley, Field Based Real-Time PCR 
Detection of Biothreat Pathogens Without Sample Extraction or Purification, 2013, BioFire, retrieved June 
24, 2013, from, 
http://www.biofiredx.com/pdfs/Posters/2011/Field%20Based%20PCR%20Detection%20Pathogens%20Wi
thout%20Sample%20Extraction%20or%20Purification-0111Pstr.pdf.  
29 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC] and National Guard, The Role of the Civil 
Support Team in Support of the Laboratory Network (Atlanta, GA: Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention and National Guard Bureau, 2009), 12–13.  
30 Diane Lang, “Dillon’s Rule…And the Birth of Home Rule,” Reprinted from The Municipal 
Reporter, December, 1991, New Mexico Municipal League, retrieved August 13, 2013, from 
http://nmml.org/wp-content/uploads/Dillon’s-Rule-The-Birth-of-Home-Rule.pdf.   
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is expected that significant variation from state to state in ConOp and QA will be 
observed if a national implementation model is not developed. 
The bioresponse framework is defined by the five elements of the Framework for 
a Biothreat and Response Mission Capability and confirmed again in the APHL Model 
Practice: Algorithm and Guidelines for Responding to an Incident Involving a Suspicious 
Non-Clinical Sample.31 The framework has matured throughout the interagency process 
that developed it and has been implemented in part at the federal, but not at the state 
level. The FBI and LRN utilize the ConOps to determine risk, but the other elements of 
the framework have not been implemented. Currently, the biothreat response community 
lacks a national training curricula and coordinated efforts to assess proficiency and 
competency. Additionally, there have been no comprehensive studies of what elements of 
the framework have been adopted at the state and local levels.  
C. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this research is to identify the barriers and best practices to 
implementation of a national biothreat response framework. The research will examine 
what actions state public health agencies are taking towards implementation, how 
emergency responders can incorporate technology, the lessons learned from the National 
Guard’s Civil Support Team program, and if an implementation model can be developed. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following are the research questions: 
 What is the current state of framework adoption at the state level? 
 What is the national bioresponse framework? 
 What is the framework implementation model?  
                                                 
31 Department of Homeland Security, Framework for Biothreat Field Response Mission Capability. 3; 
Association of Public Health Laboratories, Association of Public Health Laboratories Model Practice: 
Algorithm and Guidelines for Responding to an Incident Involving a Suspicious Non-Clinical Sample 




The results of this research are intended for state public health agencies wishing to 
undertake framework standardization in order to increase biological terrorism (BT) 
preparedness levels and the DHS Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate in their 
ongoing efforts to support the emergency responder community through the 





II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The review, consisting of searches for literature pertaining to the bioresponse 
framework and bioterrorism (BT) preparedness, was conducted in two parts. Research 
was conducted using the Naval Postgraduate School’s Dudley Knox Library32 online 
resources and the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense Information 
Analysis Center (CBRNIAC).33 The goal for the literature review was to establish a 
general understanding of the framework as it is presented in other published works and 
how it supports state/local BT preparedness. Some of the productive key words used to 
identify literature included “bioresponse,” “bioresponse framework,” “bioterrorism 
preparedness,” “weapons of mass destruction (WMD) preparedness,” and “CBRNE 
preparedness.” Other key words and phrases were used but did not produce any 
significant literature. The collected literature was reviewed for additional publications in 
order to establish primary sources.  
B. FRAMEWORK LITERATURE 
The 2001 anthrax attacks were a catalyst event for bioterrorism preparedness and 
shaped the framework that we have today. The House of Representatives Subcommittee 
on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations directed the GAO to 
assess the detection and testing activities associated with the anthrax mailings. The GAO, 
reporting in GAO-05-251, Agencies Need to Validate Sampling Activities in Order to 
Increase Confidence in Negative Results, found that agencies did not use validated 
sample collection and testing methods.34 Thus, there could be “little confidence in 
negative results.”35 The GAO report is significant because it established the need to 
validate five activities:  
                                                 
32 Dudley Knox Library is accessible at http://www.nps.edu/library/. 
33 Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear Defense Information Analysis Center is accessible at 
https://www.cbrniac.apgea.army.mil/Products/Inquiry/Pages/default.aspx  
34 GAO, Anthrax Detection. 
35 Ibid., 1. 
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1. sampling strategy development, followed by  
2. sample collection,  
3. transportation,  
4. extraction, and  
5. analysis of the samples.  
 
Figure 2.  Lack of Validation Can Affect Indicidual Activites and the Overall Process36   
The GAO used the tragic example of the Wallingford postal facility in 
Connecticut to illustrate the need to reduce false negatives. In the Wallingford example, 
the United States Postal Service (USPS) had sampled the mail facility and determined 
that it was cleared of contamination, only to trace back the cause of death of Ottilie 
Lundgren to mail that had been processed there.37 Subsequent testing confirmed that, in 
fact, the facility was contaminated, which demonstrated the worst-case scenario 
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associated with false negatives. In bioterrorism response, false negatives are 
unacceptable. The GAO reported: 
Without validation, the sampling activities could have been based on false 
assumptions. For example, the lack of validated sample collection 
methods means that it is not known how many spores a particular method 
will collect from a surface and, thus, which method is appropriate for a 
given situation. Using an ineffective method or procedure could result in a 
finding of no contamination when in fact there is contamination—a false 
negative. Because the sampling methods are not validated, it is not known 
to what extent they will underestimate contamination. Thus, in the case of 
a negative result, agencies would have no sound basis for taking public 
health measures for the occupants of the contaminated facility.38 
Limitations in detection technology were also reported in GAO-08-180 First 
Responders’ Ability to Detect and Model Hazardous Releases in Urban Areas is 
Significantly Limited. The reported stated that hand held assays (HHA), or an antigen-
antibody complex based assay, do not have the sensitivity to detect low concentrations of 
threat agents that can still be considered hazardous.39 Additionally, GAO-08-180 also 
recognized a 2002 memorandum from the White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP) that recommended against emergency responders using field 
detection, such as HHA. The report quoted OSTP recommendations that were based from 
a joint evaluation study conducted with the CDC and FBI: 
Specifically, Bacillus anthracis detection thresholds for these devices are 
well above the minimum level that can infect personnel, and are not 
suitable for determining biological determinants of personnel, rooms, or 
pieces of equipment.40 
The requirement to eliminate false negatives has been an ongoing theme in the 
development of the framework and was referenced in the FBI, DHS, HHS/CDC 
coordinated document Guidance on Initial Responses to a Suspicious Letter / Container 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 25. 
39 GAO, First Responders’ Ability to Detect, 18. 
40 Ibid. 
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with a Potential Biological Threat.41 The coordinated document describes the process to 
determine credible threat and the requirements for field screening. It was published in 
2004 and represents the first interagency consensus on ConOp. The consensus in this 
document limits field screening when biothreat agents are suspected:  
Field safety screening should be limited to ruling out explosive devices, 
radiological materials, corrosive materials and volatile organic 
compounds. Currently, there are no definitive field tests for identifying 
biological agents. Additional field testing can mislead response efforts by 
providing incorrect or incomplete results, and destroy limited materials 
critical for definitive laboratory testing required to facilitate any 
appropriate public health and law enforcement response.42 
Similar concerns regarding screening were also noted in other published 
documents. The Association of Public Health Laboratories’ APHL Model Practice: 
Algorithm and Guidelines for Responding to an Incident Involving a Suspicious Non-
Clinical Sample First Responder Algorithm diagram states in bold print “NO FIELD 
SCREENING FOR BIOLOGICAL THREAT AGENTS SHOULD OCCUR.”43 The 
APHL extrapolates this guidance in its position statement Standardized Validation of 
Screening Kits and Devices for Use in the Field to Identify Hazardous Biological and 
Chemical Agents: 
The Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL) strongly opposes 
the use of biological and chemical agent detection kits and devices for 
field testing in the absence of performance standardization, field 
validation, and certified individuals trained in the application of these kits 
and devices. It is essential that a standardized validation, approval, and 
training process for these kits and devices be developed and implemented 
as soon as possible.44 
                                                 
41 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Health and 
Human Services, and Center for Disease Control and Prevention [FBI, DHS, HHS, and CDC], Guidance on 
Initial Response to a Suspicious Letter / Container with a Potential Biological Threat (Washington, DC: 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Health and Human 
Services, and Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2004), retrieved May 24, 2012, 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/planning/pdf/suspicious-package-biothreat.pdf.  
42 Ibid., 6; John H. Marburger, “Purchase of Anthrax Detection Technologies,” July 19, 2002, 
memorandum for Federal Mail Managers and First Responders to Federal Mail Centers, Executive Office 
of the President, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Washington, DC. 
43 Association of Public Health Laboratories, Association of Public Health Laboratories Model. 
44 Association of Public Health Laboratories, Standardized Validation of Screening Kits.  
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The literature does not support the use of screening for the purpose of 
characterization. Screening is limited to determining whether the material is safe to 
collect, not to characterize it for identification purposes. The literature limits the 
determination of credibility to such things as the presences of a threatening 
communication, reports of illness or suspicion gained through other observations and 
existing intelligence.45 The process limits the role of technology and instead relies on an 
assessment of threat to determine overall risk. The literature may be contrary to the idea 
that risk determination is primarily the responsibility of the local HAZMAT team. In 
contrast, framework literature is more accepting of on-site characterization screening 
(also referred to as “biological assessment”).46 This “gap” in the framework is addressed 
in ASTM E2770-10 Standard Guide for Operational Guidelines for Initial Response to a 
Suspected Biothreat Agent:47  
3.1.13 field screening, n—field measurements utilized early in the site 
assessment process to define and delineate the contaminants present, 
support tactical decision making and address operational safety measures. 
Field screening does not include measurements of biological properties, 
which is termed on-site biological assessments (see 3.1.20).48 
And: 
3.1.20 on-site biological assessment, n—measurements of properties 
inherent to biological materials performed in the field using rapid, field 
based procedures and assays.49 
ASTM E2770-10 does not recognize biothreat agent screening, but it does open 
the door for “on-site biological assessment.”50 This change was also marked by ASTM 
E2458-10, Standard Practices for Bulk Sample Collection and Swab Collection of Visible 
Powders Suspected of Being Biothreat Agents from Nonporous Surfaces.51 ASTM 
                                                 
45 FBI, DHS, HHS, and CDC, Guidance on Initial Response to a Suspicious Letter. 
46 ASTM International. E2770-10: Standard Guide for Operational Guidelines, 3. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 3. 
50 Ibid. 8. 
51 ASTM International, E2458-10: Standard Practices for Bulk Sample Collection.  
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E2458-10 is a sample standard that directs the sampler to split the sample at point of 
sample to provide material for off-site analysis and on-site analysis (PSAA).  
In the development of a national framework these supporting documents have 
“space” for on-site biological assessments (PSAA and characterization screening), but as 
APHL has stated, that space requires “performance standardization, field validation, and 
certified individuals trained.”52 These concerns are voiced from APHL’s role in 
representing the best interests of the state’s public health laboratories and address the lack 
of a coherent quality assurance program. The concerns were addressed in the Framework 
for a Biothreat Field Response Mission Capability as part of the framework’s five critical 
elements:53 ConOp, certified training, field proficiency tests, sample handling standards, 
and validated assays set the foundation for reliable field-based results that can be useful 
in assessing hazard during the early hours of a response.  
The Framework for a Biothreat and Response Mission Capability is an 
“umbrella” document that coordinates several other publications, such as ASTM E2770-
10, ASTM E2458-10, and the FBI, DHS, HHS/CDC coordinated document. The 
document was created with interagency collaboration and reflects the same concerns 
referenced in the APHL algorithm.54 The first element (ConOp), fourth (sample 
handling), and fifth (validated technology) critical elements have been accomplished. 
What has not been accomplished at the national level are training and certification 
standards (third element), and field proficiency testing (third element).   
The requirement to implement the framework can be traced back to the 2010 
National Security Strategy, where it was stated, “There is no greater danger to the Nation 
than a terrorist with a weapon of mass destruction,” and then again in the President 
Barack Obama Administration’s release of A National Strategy for CBRNE  
Standards.55,56 The current literature does not define a strategy for implementing the 
                                                 
52 Association of Public Health Laboratories, Standardized Validation of Screening Kits. 
53 Department of Homeland Security, Framework for Biothreat Field Response Mission Capability, 3–
4. 
54 Association of Public Health Laboratories, Association of Public Health Laboratories Model. 
55 White House, National Security Strategy, 4. 
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framework, but a theme is present that does lead to one. ASTM E2770-10 “Sections 6-
Plans,” “7-Training,” and “8-Competency Assessment Exercises” provide the guidance 
necessary to establish a three-phased approach to implementation. Two of the three 
phases are also seen in the APHL position statement requirements of “field validation, 
and certified individuals trained.”57 A three-phased implementation strategy also supports 
a metric for determining biothreat response preparedness.  
C. PREPAREDNESS LITERATURE 
Measuring a state’s preparedness to respond to a biothreat event is problematic 
because actual demonstration of preparedness is as rare as the events themselves. No 
national standard of performance exists and “peer-reviewed literature is not well 
represented” with regards to evaluating biothreat preparedness in the emergency 
responder community.58 In a RAND issue paper by Fricker, Jacobson, and Davis 
Measuring and Evaluating Local Preparedness for a Chemical or Biological Terrorist 
Attack, it was found through an extensive survey of emergency responders that plans and 
exercises were considered to be the best metrics.59 However, the Fricker, Jacobson, and 
Davis paper also identified that “quantifying preparedness for terrorism, by any measure, 
is elusive.”60 In another RAND article by Nelson, Lurie, and Wasserman, Assessing 
Public Health Emergency Preparedness: Concepts, Tools, and Challenges, a conceptual 
framework for assessment was described as, “Assessment: involves comparison between 
measures of actual performance and standards that describe ideal or desired 
                                                                                                                                                 
56 National Science and Technology Council Committee on Homeland and National Security, A 
National Strategy for CBRNE Standards (White House, National Science and Technology Council 
Committee on Homeland and National Security, 2011), 4, retrieved May 10, 2012, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/chns_cbrne_standards_final_24_aug_11.pdf  
57 Association of Public Health Laboratories, Standardized Validation of Screening Kits. 
58 Christopher Nelson, Nicole Lurie, Jeffrey Wasserman, “Assessing Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness: Concept, Tools, and Challenges,” Annual Review of Public Health, vol. 28 (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 2007), 1–18, retrieved May 10, 2012, from http://publhealth.annualreviews.org. 
59 Ronald Fricker, Jerry Jacobson, Lois Davis, Measuring and Evaluating Local Preparedness for a 
Chemical or Biological Terrorist Attack (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 2, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP217.html (accessed May 10, 2012). 
60 Ibid., 1. 
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performance.”61 The ASTM E2770-10 sections can be used to support a Nelson, Lurie, 
and Wasserman assessment framework: phase 1, training, and phase 3, plans, approach 
for “standards that describe ideal or desired performance,” and a phase 2, exercises 
approach as “actual performance.”  
The literature indicates linking evidence-based preparedness to policy objectives 
has been elusive because performance metrics are not clearly defined. Nelson, Lurie, and 
Wasserman identified that without performance metrics it will be “difficult to assess the 
effectiveness of past investments, engage in continuous quality improvement of current 
efforts, or design and target future efforts.”62 
This is problematic when we consider the substantial investments in preparedness 
that have occurred since President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-
39, U.S. Policy on Combating Terrorism.63 Falkenrath describes the U.S. preparedness 
program from the 1990s up to 2001 in Problems of Preparedness: U.S. Readiness for a 
Domestic Terrorist Attack.64 Furthermore, he captures a historical perspective that is 
useful in explaining the preparedness program that we have today and why we have some 
of the problems we do.65 In addition, he observes that the “domestic program is 
unprecedented and highly complex, has grown very fast and confronts a range of public 
management challenges.”66  
The complexity derives, in part, from the fact that as a policy initiative, domestic 
preparedness is essentially a subset of U.S. counterterrorism policy, but in practice it is 
functionally related to disaster management. Most preparedness activities are closely 
                                                 
61 Nelson, Lurie, Wasserman, Assessing Public Health Emergency Preparedness, 1–18.  
62 Ibid., 2. 
63 Gregory D. Koblentz, “Overview of Federal Programs to Enhance State and Local Preparedness for 
Terrorism with Weapons of Mass Destruction” (BCISA Discussion Paper 2001-5) (Boston, MA Harvard 
University, 2001), 2, Belfer Center, retrieved May 5, 2012, from 
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Decision Directive 39 Policy on Counterterrorism (Washington, DC: White House, 1995), Federation of 
American Scientists, retrieved May 5, 2012, from http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm. 
64 Richard Falkenrath, “Problems of Preparedness: U.S. Readiness for a Domestic Terrorist Attack,” 
International Security 25, no. 4 (2001): 147–186.   
65 Ibid.  
66 Ibid., 148. 
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related to basic disaster management functions, such as training, acquiring special 
equipment, developing plans, and conducting exercises. However, because the program 
has emerged as a subset of counterterrorism policy, the agencies that implement it are 
largely segregated from preparedness activities. Historically, agencies have developed 
WMD response plans and initiatives separate from the Federal Response Plan, while 
policy development has been led by the White House, with little input from the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).67 According to Falkenrath, this has resulted 
in limited interagency coordination and may be partly responsible for the lack of federal 
guidance on performing readiness evaluations.68 This also explains why credibility 
assessments, which are primarily the responsibility of law enforcement (i.e., counter 
terrorism and prevention), are not a HAZMAT (domestic preparedness and consequence 
management) function.  
Of interest to the implementation of the framework, under the 1996 Nunn-Lugar-
Domenici legislation, Falkenrath observes that the:  
Secretary of Defense shall carry out a program to provide civilian 
personnel of Federal, State and local agencies with training and expert 
advice regarding emergency response to threatened use of a weapon of 
mass destruction or related material.69  
At that time, Falkenrath observed that the Pentagon was hesitant to assume this 
role because it was viewed as something other than its “core mission of war fighting.”70 
In 2013, as overseas operations wind down, the Department of Defense is seeking to 
define mission space for its CBRN enterprise that was largely built post-9/11. That 
mission space could include supporting civil authorities in implementation of the 
framework through training and exercises as originally envisioned under the Nunn-
Lugar-Domenici legislation.71 
                                                 
67 Ibid., 160. 
68 Ibid. 171–172. 
69 Ibid., 162. 
70 Ibid., 162. 
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D. CONCLUSION  
The national strategy clearly identifies the need to establish a national biothreat 
response framework. The framework is loosely defined in the DHS document Framework 
for Biothreat Field Response Mission Capability and ASTM E2770-10. The APHL 
document Algorithm and Guidelines for Responding to an Incident Involving a 
Suspicious Non-Clinical Sample provides a workable ConOp. The lack of on-site 
biological assessment, including sample characterization screening, represents a gap in 
the framework ConOp considering that validated technology is available (e.g., Response 
Biomedical Corporation’s RAMP System).72 Additionally, the literature does not provide 
guidance on implementation, but a theme is present that can be synthesized into a three-
phased implementation model: phase 1, training; phase 2, exercises; and phase 3, plans.  
The literature on biothreat preparedness identifies the lack of an evidence-based 
assessment program, but the literature can be synthesized to support the same three-
phased implementation model. In the current fiscal crisis, the cost of implementation is 
going to be a hurdle that must be addressed up front. The literature establishes the 
concept that the Department of Defense CBRN enterprise is positioned and sufficiently 
resourced to play a significant role in the three-phased implementation model. 
Determining if the cost of a national framework is justified by the gains in local 
preparedness is going to be difficult. Framework metrics for evaluating preparedness do 
not exist and this represents a gap in our national doctrine.  
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Research was organized into two methods in order to:  
1. analyze the state of framework adoption within a sample of state public 
health agencies,  
2. and to deductively analyze the potential impact of improving the 
framework ConOp.  
The purpose of the research is to produce an outcome that broadens the current 
understanding of the framework and its level of adoption, in order to offer up a 
recommended implementation model for use by state governments and DHS S&T.  
1. APHL survey 
a. What is the current state of framework adoption at the state level? 
2. Hypothetic-deductive framework analysis  
b. What is the national bioresponse framework? 
c. What is the framework implementation model?  
B. APHL SURVEY 
1. Methodology 
An APHL survey was sent to all APHL member laboratories. Member 
laboratories are the state public health laboratories that are designated CDC Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) members. LRN laboratories are the facilities that provide 
confirmatory analysis for unknown substances suspected of being a biological hazard. 
Participation was strictly on a voluntary basis.  The survey was addressed to each 
laboratory’s BT coordinators. BT coordinators have a unique vantage point within the 
ConOp that allows them to evaluate framework adoption activities. Recruitment occurred 
via an emailed survey description sent by APHL to all member laboratories with a link to 




The online survey consisted of 27 questions distributed over three sections:  
1. training,  
2. competency and proficiency evaluation exercises, and  
3. plans and guidance (Appendix).  
Each section had a similar series of five questions utilizing a Likert item response 
format. The five topics used in each question series included:  
ConOp (roles and responsibilities, field exercises and certification levels),  
4. risk assessment,  
5. presumptive analysis (PSAA),  
6. sample collection, and  
7. sample screening.  
A Likert scale was used to assess the implementation level responses. The 15 
Likert scale responses were calculated to determine a representative implementation 
average and then ranked. 
Furthermore, one additional topic was used in each question series pertaining to 
collaboration with a list of possible response items. The other eight questions were a mix 
of open ended and yes/no responses allowing participants to elaborate on their 
implementation activities. Questions and response options were derived from ASTM 
E2770-10: Sections 6-Plans, 7-Training, and 8-Competency Assessment.73 
2. Data Evidence 
Out of 50 possible state public health laboratories, 27 BT coordinators completed 
the survey—a response rate of 54 percent. Participants were given the option not to 
answer a question, and participation varied from question to question. On average, 12 
participants skipped questions in each of the sections, giving an overall response rate of 
56 percent among the participating states. Some states indicated that they did not know 
the answer and thus were not factored into the response data, adjusting the response rate 
of participating states down to 45 percent. On average for any given question, 24.3 
percent of the possible BT coordinators nationwide participated. Results were scored 
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according to responder selection on a Likert scale with one as the lowest level of 
implementation and five as full implementation. Responses for open ended and 
collaboration questions were analyzed for content.  
3. Survey Results 
The survey results indicate that some implementation activity is occurring in each 
of the three implementation phases. Activity in any of the phases is significant because it 
indicates state implementation activity rather than federal. Table 1 displays the three 
section results (plans, training, and exercises) and their ranking based on the averaged 
responses of the section’s questions. This was accomplished by totaling results for each 
question and dividing the total by the number of participants. The overall averages from 
each section were then calculated again and used to rank the categories from one to three, 
with one indicating the greatest level of activity.  




Results of the analysis rank implementation as: 1) plans, 2) training and, 3) 
competency and proficiency evaluation exercises. Participation in question responses 
ranked similarly with plans, having a total of 54 responses, training 48, and exercises 43. 
Response participation was voluntary and reasons for opting out were not identified. A 
possible explanation may be that states with activity to report participated with greater 
frequency than those with no activity to report.   
The rankings are consistent with the process order of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency’s (FEMA) “preparedness cycle” (Figure 3), which indicates greater 
activity earlier in the cycle.74 Analysis of these findings indicates that conceptual ideas, 
such as plans and guidance are facilitating framework implementation with greater 
frequency than emergency responder activities such as exercises and training.  
 
Figure 3.  FEMA Preparedness Cycle Diagram75 
Plans represent a community’s potential to prepare for and provide a unified 
response to a hazardous event. FEMA describes planning as part of the national 
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preparedness cycle as, “Strategic and operational planning establishes priorities, 
identifies expected levels of performance and capability requirements, provides the 
standard for assessing capabilities and helps stakeholders learn their roles.”76 
Collaboration in the development of state plans and guidance is important to 
implementation because it is an indicator of the extent to which the framework ConOp 
has been implemented. The first question in the Plans Section established who within the 
state was collaborating on bio-response plans and guidance. 
 
Figure 4.  Question 20 
Analysis of the responses (including “other”) indicate that 14 states, or 77.8 
percent (n = 18), identified collaboration with their FBI WMD coordinator. In addition, 
13 states (66.7 percent) also indicated collaboration with their National Guard Civil 
Support Team (CST). In contrast to these federally resourced agencies, 12 states (66.7 
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percent) identified collaboration with their first responder community. Only two states 
(11.1 percent) identified other agencies as write-ins, including the United States Postal 
Inspection Service (USPIS). Federally resourced agencies were collaborated with 
equally, or more, than with the local emergency responder community. Furthermore, 
three states (21.4 percent) identified no collaboration. The remaining five question results 
in the Plans Section indicate the order of implementation activity as: roles and 
responsibilities (2.923, n = 13), sample screening (2.818, n = 11), sample collection (2.7, 
n = 10), risk assessment (2.444, n = 9), and PSAA (1.181, n = 11). Therefore, results 
indicate that implementation activity with regard to the ConOp (roles and 
responsibilities) is reflected greater in plans than emergency responder actions such as 
sample collection and sample screening. The order of implementation for responder 
actions (screening, sample collection and risk assessment) was consistent with the 
Training Section. PSAA planning (1.181, n = 11) was ranked the lowest, which indicates 
some states have incorporated emergency responder results into their ConOp, but 
implementation is lagging behind other framework elements. This is significant to the 
ConOp because PSAA results may be considered disruptive if the state is not 
incorporating a QA program. Low PSAA implementation may indicate difficulty in 
adopting a QA program, altering an existing ConOp plan, or the absence of PSAA 
detection instruments in the field. Furthermore, additional inquiry into the reasons why 
PSAA is lagging is needed.  
Training represents a community’s ability to enhance its emergency responders 
with the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to perform key tasks required by specific 
capabilities. In the FEMA Preparedness Cycle, training is “…based on information 
derived from the assessments, strategies, and plans developed in previous steps of the 
Preparedness Cycle.”77 Any training activity at the state level specific to framework 
implementation is significant because there is currently no coordinated national training 
curriculum for biothreat response.78 Training programs, and specifically the presence of 
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certified training levels, are state initiatives. Training programs indicate a proactive 
investment from the state to standardize response activities and are strong indicator of 
future framework adoption. In addition, 45percent (n = 20) of the responding public 
health laboratories reported that their state has a first responder-training program for 
bioresponse, with two states indicating some level of certification.  
As in the prior section, the first training question was asked in order to identify 
who is participating in training development. Collaboration is vital to implementation 
because of the impact it has on standardization across diverse agencies.  
 
Figure 5.  Question 3 
Using the “Other (please specify)” results combined with the listed results, 
responses to training collaboration indicate that the FBI coordinator was involved with 
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70.6 percent (n = 17) of the participating state laboratories, and the CST was involved 
with 76.5 percent. Emergency responders were collaborated with to a lesser extent: 
HazMat 58.8 percent, fire departments and local law enforcement 41.2 percent, and state 
law enforcement 46.2 percent.  
The results indicate that states are primarily collaborating with federally resourced 
agencies instead of local emergency responders. These findings indicate opportunity for a 
national standardization effort led by the state public health laboratory in collaboration 
with the National Guard’s CST program and the FBI. The other five question results in 
the Training Section indicate the order of implementation activity as: sample screening 
(2.727, n = 11), sample collection (2.636, n = 11), risk assessment (2.182, n = 11), psaa 
(2, n = 5), and certification (.9, n = 10). Certification was reported markedly lower than 
the other framework components. Training is occurring but states appear to be reluctant 
to assign certification levels. Reasons for this could be that states see little benefit due to 
a low prevalence of PSAA technology, or rejection by the emergency responder 
community. Of the five states that reported PSAA training in question, five only one 
reported having certification levels. It is unclear why certification levels are not part of 
state training and additional research should seek to establish the reasons why.  
Sample screening training activity was higher than the other framework 
components, including PSAA. For example, 58.8 percent (n = 17) of the participating 
states indicated that they were training emergency responders on state developed 
screening protocols. In addition, 7.6 percent reported using the FBI-DHS-HHS/CDC 
coordinated document, and 11.8 percent reported using the APHL Algorithm. In contrast, 
25 percent (n = 20) of the participating public health laboratories reported in question five 
that they were incorporating PSAA technology, such as PCR, into their emergency 
responder training programs. This is significant since there are no national standards 
regarding PSAA, and states are developing their own in the absence of national 
standards.  
Exercises represent a community’s ability to assess competency and proficiency 
and incorporate lessons learned into their existing plans. Because biothreat incidents 
involving actual pathogens are rare, exercises provide the next best opportunity to 
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evaluate preparedness.79 FEMA describes exercises within the National Preparedness 
Cycle as “an objective assessment of gaps and shortfalls within plans, policies and 
procedures to address areas for improvement prior to a real-world incident.”80 Exercises 
are fundamental to implementation because they clarify roles and responsibilities. 11 
states, or 55 percent (n = 20) reported that they are conducting functional exercises with 
their emergency responder community. As with the prior sections, the first question was 
designed to identify who is participating in exercises.  
 
Figure 6.  Question 12 
                                                 
79 Fricker, Jacobson, and Davis, Measuring and Evaluating Local Preparedness. 4.  
80 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness Cycle. 
 30
Analysis of the responses (including “other”) indicated that 11 states, or 61.1 
percent (n = 18), are exercising with their CST. Other federally resourced agencies 
include the FBI (11.1 percent) and the USPIS (5.6 percent). States reported exercising 
with emergency responders (27.8 percent) and law enforcement (16.7 percent) to a lesser 
extent. Therefore, states that participated are reporting that they have established exercise 
relationships primarily with their CST, and to a lesser extent, their local emergency 
responder communities. Reasons for the reliance of CST exercise participation could be 
because of their role in facilitating exercises, their statewide response role vs. a specific 
county or municipality, or their utilization of PSAA results. Additional inquiry should be 
conducted in order to determine why CST are prominent in field exercises.  
The remaining five question results in the Exercise Section indicate the order of 
implementation activity as: field exercises (3.6, n = 10), sample collection (2.222, n = 9), 
risk assessment (2, n = 8), sample screening (1.875, n = 8), and PSAA (.375 n = 8). The 
order of the emergency responder activities changed with screening dropping from the 
highest to the lowest. PSAA remained last in order but also had a significant drop in 
reported activity. PSAA and screening represent detection technology and given the 
results it is concluded that more effort needs to occur in order to evaluate proficiency and 
the impact of on-site detection to the ConOp. Reasons for the low reporting could be 
related to the lack of challenge material availability for testing screening and PSAA 
results. The reasons for not exercising technology should be identified because without 
evaluating the testing process between field and LRN states will not be able to measure 
preparedness. Exercises should not end once the sample is collected, they should continue 
to include LRN results in order to evaluate the entire ConOp and testing algorithm.  
C. SURVEY ANALYSIS 
Survey results indicate public health activities support response framework 
implementation with activity in all three phases. BT coordinators reported that they are 
collaborating with their CST and FBI WMD coordinators in all three phases. Federal 
collaboration at the state level indicates a common link to all APHL laboratories, since 
each state has a CST and FBI WMD coordinator. The CST and FBI are federally 
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resourced and have standardized methods and procedures. Local collaboration was also 
reported but to a lesser degree, indicating a potential for future effort. 
The analysis of PSAA implementation data across the three categories of plans, 
training and exercises was at a lower level (1.185) than all other components of the 
framework. PSAA also had the lowest survey participation rate (n = 24), which may 
indicate that states with implementation activity participated in greater frequency than 
those with no activity.  In comparison, sample screening had a higher level of 
implementation (2.473) and survey participation (n = 30). These findings indicate that 
states maybe implementing screening with greater frequency than PSAA. Based on these 
results, it is probable that more states will need technology to support screening activities 
other than PSAA. It was unclear from the survey if emergency responders were 
conducting biological characterization, or just safety screening.  
Both lines of questioning pertain to technology and have significant impact on a 
state’s ConOp. Several states reported that they rely on their CST for PSAA, which is an 
indication that the concept of on-site biological assessment is beneficial. One state 
reported the use of lateral flow immunoassays (referred to as a hand held assay [HHA]) 
with PCR in progress. HHA results are used to screen samples and this state’s response 
may characterize a larger trend amongst the states to implement screening in greater 
frequency than PSAA. Reasons for this suspected trend may include characterization 
preference over PSAA due to lower QA requirements, lower cost of screening 
technology, or the impact of results on the ConOp.  
State training indicates a higher occurrence of screening than PSAA, but five 
states reported that they had incorporated PSAA technologies into their state training 
programs. Without national training standards, we can expect that states will develop 
their own, resulting in significant variation from one state to the next. While training 
programs need to be state specific, the utilization of technology and the development of 
analytical methods to support its use should not. PSAA standardization should occur at 
the national level. State activity in this component of the framework indicates a potential 
for the standardization window to close in these states if a national training curriculum is 
not developed quickly.  
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IV. HYPOTHETIC-DEDUCTION FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS 
A. METHODOLOGY 
Hypothetic-deduction is a method of research in which a hypothetical framework 
based on observations is proposed and then tested by consequences from the model.81 In 
this analysis, I will develop a hypothetical bioresponse framework based on observations 
from the CST program. Aspects from the CST program can be used to develop an 
improved framework for the emergency responder community. This analysis will help 
future implementation efforts by offering a suggested framework model that has 
significant improvements over the current one.  
B. HYPOTHESIS 
Implementation can be successful with a modified framework that incorporates 
on-site biological assessment, including sample characterization screening and PSAA. 
The use of technology in the hazard assessment and threat analysis ConOp will not be 
disruptive because results will be considered reliable. The modified framework will be 
modeled after the successful CST program, which includes a workable quality assurance 
program and centralized logistical support.  
C. DATA EVIDENCE 
1. What the Current Framework is Missing 
The field based triage framework described in the APHL Algorithm82 and ASTM 
E2770-1083 quickly seeks to determine the level of risk associated with a suspicious 
substance. Risk is determined by conducting a threat and hazard assessment; then the 
level of risk is used to guide responder actions during a response. The triage ConOp 
                                                 
81 Academic Dictionaries and Encyclopedias, s.v. hypothetic deduction, last modified 2013, retrieved 
May 22, 2013, from http://universalium.academic.ru/130304/hypothetico-deductive_method. 
82 Association of Public Health Laboratories, Association of Public Health Laboratories Model. 
83 ASTM International. E2770-10: Standard Guide for Operational Guidelines. 
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works to reduce consequences by accurately identifying true acts of bioterrorism while 
reducing the impact of copycat events.  
After the anthrax attacks of 2001, detection technology in the field was not 
considered suitable for use by emergency responders. False positives and negatives meant 
that results were unreliable and thus unusable during the hazard assessment and threat 
analysis process. From the start, the framework ConOp emerged relying on judgments 
derived from conducting a threat evaluation. The threat was determined by the presence 
of threating communications, dissemination devices, victims presenting with signs and 
symptoms, or intelligence warning of an impending event. The national guidance was 
biased heavily towards the role of a law enforcement threat evaluation and against the use 
of technology by a trained HAZMAT technician. The bias was reflected in the guidance 
documents and described during the literature review. 
The literature is contradictory at best, and it is lacking in any clear standard with 
regard to on-site biological assessment or PSAA. Space has been set aside within the 
ConOp literature for “jurisdictions choosing to integrate on-site assessment into response 
procedures…,” but the literature does not rely on “on-site assessment.”84 Instead, the 
literature promotes the importance of conducting a threat assessment. This gap in the 
hazard assessment and threat analysis process can be problematic to the overall 
determination of risk. The literature review established that the CDC or the FBI do not 
accept on-site biological assessment results because they “…can mislead response efforts 
by providing incorrect or incomplete results, and destroy limited materials critical for 
definitive laboratory testing.”85 Instead, the threat assessment—which is fundamentally a 
judgment call made by law enforcement and not certified HAZMAT technicians—is the 
determining factor in risk. This assumption only works if one accepts that judgment calls 
by law enforcement are less likely to be “incorrect or incomplete” than screening and 
testing results by a certified HAZMAT team.  
                                                 
84 Ibid., 8. 
85 FBI, DHS, HHS, and CDC, Guidance on Initial Response to a Suspicious Letter, 6. 
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In practice, doctrine often times lags behind innovation and trend. HAZMAT 
teams are using technology to support their hazard assessments; the results can be 
considered disruptive to the ConOp if they are rejected by other responding agencies, 
such as the FBI. These results can also be disruptive if they are incorrect, and without 
validated assays, certified training, or quality assurance measures, such as proficiency 
testing, the accuracy of the results cannot be gauged.  
2. CST Comparison 
The Civil Support Team program came online during the 2001 anthrax attacks 
with 10 original teams located to respond within each FEMA region. Each team consists 
of 22 full-time personnel encompassing 14 career specialties. Their mission is to respond 
to requests by civil authorities during a CBRN event. The teams have unique capabilities, 
such as a mobile laboratory, that make them a valuable resource to their local 
communities.86 The initial success of the CST program saw a rapid expansion from the 
original 10 teams to 57, one for each state and territory, with several states fielding two 
teams. CSTs are federally resourced and standardized.   
In contrast to their local emergency responder counterparts, CSTs are funded to 
train, equip, and maintain readiness at a level that is unachievable by most local agencies. 
Since the certification of the original 10 teams in 2001, the CST program has established 
a robust quality assurance program that ensures consistent and accurate on-site biological 
assessment and PSAA results. CST results are accepted by other responding agencies and 
are not considered disruptive to the hazard assessment and threat analysis process. The 
components of the CST program that directly support the credibility of field results will 
be used to develop an improved hypothetical framework.  
CST survey sections are equipped not only to conduct safety screenings for 
radiological, explosive, and volatile hazards, but the teams can also conduct base 
characterization at point of sample. This unique capability is accepted by the LRN as one 
                                                 
86 Headquarters Department of the Army, Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Team 
Operations (FM3-11.22) (Headquarters Department of the Army, 2007), retrieved August 13, 2013, from 
http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_11x22.pdf. 
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of the CST’s primary assets. 87 Characterization is accomplished through the use of 
technology, such as lateral flow immunoassays, for detecting select agents. The assays 
cannot be used to clear a sample for biological hazard, but they can be significant in 
terms of characterizing it as a biological hazard. The analytical laboratory system (ALS), 
a mobile laboratory with PCR capability and additional immunoassay capability, 
accomplishes PSAA testing of a sample. On-site biological assessment not only feeds the 
hazard assessment process, but also helps in determining an analytical strategy. ALS 
PSAA results are considered reliable, but an LRN laboratory must accomplish final 
confirmation.88  
The CST program has made significant investments in ensuring that screening 
and testing results are accurate and consistent by obtaining ISO 17025 accreditation.89 
The CST program partnered with Signature Science to develop a quality management 
system that met the requirements of the ISO 17025 standard in the context of the unique 
CST mission.90 Components of the quality assurance program included standardized 
training, validated methods and procedures, external evaluations, and third-party 
delivered proficiency tests. The quality management system established the program’s 
credibility and bolstered the defensibility of the analytical data. The end result of the 
effort is a state level asset that can screen and test samples in the field in order to provide 
a fully developed hazard assessment within a matter of hours after arriving on scene.  
The CST is a unique asset that requires robust logistical support. Another 
significant component of the quality assurance program is ensuring that equipment is 
operating within prescribed parameters, supplies are up to date, and deficient equipment 
is replaced before it can affect the quality of a result. Without a robust and centralized 
logistics system, the CST program would not be able maintain ISO 17025 accreditation.   
                                                 
87 CDC and National Guard, The Role of the Civil Support Team, 1. 
88 Ibid., 12–13. 
89 ISO/IEC Resource Center, “Accreditation,” ISO/IEC Resource Center, retrieved July 22, 2013, 
from http://www.isoiec17025.com/wst_page4.html.  
90 M. Isbell, “ISO 17025 Accreditation of the U.S. National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
Civil Support Team Mobile Laboratory,” poster presentation at National Environmental Monitoring 
Conference, Austin, Texas, 2013, retrieved June 14, 2013, from 
http://nemc.us/meeting/2013/load_abstract.php?id=169. 
 37
3. Hypothetical Framework 
An improved framework, as envisioned in the Framework for a Biothreat Mission 
Capability and required by the National Strategy for CBRNE Standards, will utilize 
innovative technology to raise local preparedness. Drawing from the CST program 
example, a framework model can be developed that is specific for emergency responders. 
The improved framework will:  
1. utilize detection technology to support on-site biological assessment and 
PSAA testing at point of sample,  
2. adapt the ConOp to use the technology to improve the hazard assessment 
process,  
3. strengthen the credibility and accuracy of results through a responder 
specific quality assurance program, and  
4. increase mission readiness through a centralized logistics program. These 
four improvements will increase local preparedness and improve the triage 
process of determining the risk associated with a suspicious substance 
event.  
An improved framework would deploy technology to support the hazard 
assessment process. Detection technology can be categorized as either on-site biological 
assessment or PSAA, which defines how the results will support the ConOp. The 
difference between on-site biological assessment (i.e., screening and PSAA testing) is the 
potential for false negative results. False results can occur because the technology does 
not have the specificity or sensitivity to accurately detect, or because the technology is 
not utilized effectively. Therefore, technology should be validated in the context of the 
framework ConOp.   
Examples of detection technology for on-site biological assessment include pH 
and protein detection (i.e., BioCheck91), fluorescence staining (e.g., Prime Alert)92 ATP 
detection (i.e., GenPrime Prime Alert Kit93), and lateral flow immunoassays (BioThreat 
                                                 
91 BioCheck, “20/20Gene Systems,” BioCheck, retrieved May 10, 2012, from 
http://biocheckinfo.com/. 
92 Smiths Detection, “Prime Alert,” Smiths Detection, retrieved August 13, 2013, from 
http://www.smithsdetection.com/en/biological-agents-detection/114-biological-agents-detection/prime-
alert.html.  
93 GenPrime, “Prime Alert,” GenPrime, retrieved May 10, 2012, from 
http://www.genprime.com/products_primealert.asp. 
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Alert94). Other characterization technologies include Fourier transform infrared (FTIR) 
spectroscopy (e.g., Smith’s Detection HazMatID95). FTIR can identify protein and the 
presence of silica in powder, which is used as aerosolizing agent.96  PSAA testing can be 
supported with technology that was once the domain of the fixed laboratory. Real-time 
PCR platforms (such as the BioFire Diagnostics RAZOR,97 or FilmArray,98 Smiths 
Detection BioSeeq,99 Tetracore T-COR4,100 or GeneReach USA POCKIT101) are 
capable of reducing the occurrence of false negative results to a level that should be 
acceptable to the FBI and CDC. PCR results, as demonstrated by the CST program102, 
can be factored into the risk assessment process.  
Although a number of on-site biological assessment and PSAA detection 
technologies are commercially available to first responders, few of them have undergone 
rigorous third party evaluation.103 For a detailed review of available technologies for 
field use, see the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) report Biodetection 
                                                 
94 Tetracore, “BioThreat Alert,” Tetracore, retrieved May 10, 2013, from 
http://www.tetracore.com/bio-warfare/index.html. 
95 HazMat ID. Smiths Detection http://www.smithsdetection.com/hazmatid360.php (accessed May 10, 
2013). 
96 BioFire Diagnostics Inc., “Biologic Field Identification,” Armed Forces International, last modified 
June 7, 2009, retrieved May 10, 2013, from http://www.armedforces-int.com/article/biological-field-
identification.html.  
97 BioFire Diagnostics Inc., “Razor,” BioFire Diagnostics Inc., retrieved May 10, 2013, 
http://www.biofiredx.com/RAZOREX/. 
 98 BioFire Diagnostics Inc., “FilmArray,” BioFire Diagnostics Inc., retrieved May 10, 2013, from 
http://www.filmarray.com/  
99 Smiths Detection, “BioSeeq.” Smiths Detection, retrieved May 10, 2013, from 
http://www.smithsdetection.com/Bio-Seeq_PLUS.php. 
100 Tetracore, “T-COR4,” Tetracore, retrieved May 10, 2013, from http://www.tetracore.com/t-
cor/index.html. 
101 POCKIT. GeneReach USA, retrieved May 10, 2013, from http://www.genereach-
us.com/product.php?a_id=1003&b_id=1004&id=114 (accessed May 10, 2013) 
102 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Field Divisions and National Guard Civil Support Teams,” 
memorandum of agreement (electronic communication 66F-HQ-A1430160, serial 153), January 2003; 
Association of Public Health Laboratories, Association of Public Health Laboratories Model, 9; CDC and 
National Guard, The Role of the Civil Support Team, 2. 
103 Mary Wade, Mark Campbell, James Rogers, Burt Coursey, Kikoli Niyogi, Jennifer Coughlin, and 
Peter Emanuel, Evaluation of an Inexpensive Field Test for Ruling out the Presence of Biological Threat 
Agents in Suspicious Powders (ECBC-TR-459) (Edgewood Maryland, Edgewood Chemical Biological 
Center, 2006), 1. 
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Technologies for First Responders (PNNL-21713).104 An improved framework must 
have validated assays in order to integrate the technology into the existing ConOp. Most 
handheld detection will not be suitable for PSAA due to issues of low sensitivity, cross-
reactivity with environmental agents, and user error in interpreting results.105  
If technologies undergo a third party evaluation, such as the stakeholder panel on 
agent assays (SPADA), and their performance potential is acceptable for the ConOp and 
the appropriate assay level (e.g. on-site biological assessment, PSAA), then the results 
should be factored into the hazard assessment in order to support the risk assessment 
process as defined in ASTM E2770-10 Section 10.106 Detection technology is capable of 
enhancing the hazard assessment process beyond simple judgment calls made by law 
enforcement regarding threat. Technology can support the hazard assessment process so 
that it can be used to triage events during sample surge. Significant limitations to hand 
held detection for the purpose of characterization mean that results should only be 
considered in the absence of confirmatory results from an LRN laboratory, and should be 
used to elevate risk, not reduce it.  
In contrast, presumptive testing results can be used to make PSAA decisions 
because the technology is capable of reducing the issues associated with field detection 
such as sensitivity and specificity. PSAA results should only be used in the absence of 
confirmatory results by an LRN laboratory; limited decisions can be made regarding risk 
to the immediate public, such as evacuating or determining decontamination strategies. 
The accuracy and credibility of the results must be determined prior to an event, and a 
robust quality assurance program, as per ASTM E2770-10 Section 8,107 should include: 
                                                 
104 Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, “Biodetection Technologies for First Responders” 




105 “Preliminary Findings on the Evaluation of Hand-Held Immunoassays for Bacillus anthracis and 
Yersinia pestis,” Forensic Science Communications 5 no 1 (2003) retrieved June 12, 2013, from 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/forensic-science-communications/fsc/jan2003/fsru.htm; Carrie Poore, Paul 
Clark, and Peter Emanuel, “An Evaluation of Suspicious Powder Screening Tools for First Responders,” 
Journal of Hazardous Materials 172 (2009): 565.  
106 ASTM International. E2770-10: Standard Guide for Operational Guidelines, 7. 
107 Ibid., 6. 
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standardized training, proficiency panels and annual field exercises in collaboration with 
the state’s LRN laboratory and FBI WMD coordinator.  
Additional components of quality assurance that are not specified in the ASTM 
E2770-10 are drawn from the CST program example and include a centralized logistics 
program with centralized oversight. PSAA testing, such as PCR platforms, requires costs 
well beyond the initial purchase. Local agencies will need support for their reagents and 
maintenance. If not, supplies that affect the quality of a result, such as reagents, will not 
be standardized. In addition, maintenance should be centralized and defective equipment 
should be exchanged for working equipment in order to maintain mission readiness. It 
would be a mistake to allow local agencies to purchase PCR platforms through a federal 
grant for a one-time purchase with no thought as to maintaining it. The detection 
platforms should be DHS property and issued to a local agency that has a demonstrated 
need, agree to participation in a quality assurance program, and demonstrate proficiency 
through externally evaluated functional exercises conducted in conjunction with the LRN 
and FBI.  
4. Framework Consequences 
Because of home rule, the biothreat framework must be flexible to meet the local 
requirements of the adopting state. Some components of the framework—such as the 
development of standards, the oversight of a quality assurance program, and the 
management of a centralized logistical support program—need to be national initiatives. 
Additionally, adoption must be voluntary since the framework also resides at the 
community and state levels. Components that are state initiatives should include training 
programs that incorporate national standards such as ASTM E-2458-10, functional 
exercises that incorporate competency and proficiency evaluations, and developing state 
plans and guidance documents that incorporate the framework ConOp and national 
standards, such as ASTM E2770-10. Framework implementation and the eventual 
maintenance will require federal funding streams, interagency cooperation, and clear 
guidance regarding responsibilities between the federal and state initiatives. 
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The consequences of using technology to support on-site biological assessment 
and PSAA testing include increased demands for the development of performance 
standards. Since the 2001 anthrax attacks, there has been a proliferation in the 
development and fielding of detectors that screen and test for the presence of biological 
agents.108 Local agencies have limited means to verify if the detectors work as described, 
since they lack the ability to validate performance. Validated assays, the fifth critical 
framework element in the Framework for a Biothreat Field Response Mission Capability 
document,109 addresses this consequence. There are two sub-elements that are necessary 
to achieve validated assays: performance specification standards and testing and 
certification. The framework document recommended that DHS continues to fund the 
established SPADA process to develop performance standards and that DHS use third 
party laboratories to test and certify assays in conjunction with the vendor in order to 
share costs.  
The consequences of integrating on-site biological assessment and PSAA testing 
results into the ConOp to support the risk assessment process will require interagency 
consensus. Agencies will have to revise their guidance to emergency responders, such as 
the FBI, DHS, HHS, CDC coordinated document.110 Getting interagency consensus on 
guidance will be difficult, but should not delay implementation. DHS will need to take 
the lead in establishing consensus, which can be argued is in support of the White 
House’s National Strategy for CBRNE Standards Goal 4: “Promote enduring CBRNE 
standard operating procedures for Federal, State, local, and tribal use to improve National 
preparedness and response.”111 
Consequences of adopting a quality assurance program for emergency responder 
accreditation include the oversight and operation of the program. State governments will 
most likely not have the capability or resources to conduct a program themselves. 
                                                 
108 Peter Emanuel and Matthew Caples, Chemical, Biological, Radiological Technology Survey (Ft. 
Belvoir, VA: Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 2011), retrieved May 10, 2012, from 
https://www.rkb.us/contentdetail.cfm?content_id=262170.  
109 Department of Homeland Security, Framework for Biothreat Field Response Mission Capability. 
110 FBI, DHS, HHS, and CDC, Guidance on Initial Response to a Suspicious Letter. 
111 Department of Homeland Security, A National Strategy for CBRNE Standards, 13. 
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Therefore, the program should be administered by a third-party, with oversight being 
conducted by the LRN. The quality assurance program will need to be tailored for the 
emergency responder community; a key component of the program is the ASTM E2770-
10 requirement to conduct annual proficiency test exercises in conjunction with the FBI 
and LRN.112  
Field proficiency evaluations will require the development of challenge material 
(biological agents that can be detected) that does not pose a contamination threat to the 
public or responder equipment. Challenge materials for use in a traditional laboratory are 
usually attenuated versions of the pathogenic agent that the assay is designed to detect. 
Their use outside of a laboratory facility will require significant safety controls and 
oversight in order to avoid unintentional exposure or contamination of equipment and 
personal protection equipment (PPE). This was one of the major findings of the 
Operation Vigilant Sample (OVS) exercises, which used gamma irradiated sterne (B. 
anthraces) spores as the exercise challenge material.  
The use of attenuated agents can lead to the contamination of responder 
equipment with several of the same molecular markers that can be detected by PCR at the 
LRN during a real world response. Therefore, field exercises should use a safe challenge 
material, such as Saccharomyces cerevisiae (yeast). Yeast assays are being developed by 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to support field exercises. The 
implication of using something other than the agent that the assays are designed to detect 
is that the test is no longer determining proficiency. A new quality assurance approach is 
needed for evaluation that is appropriate for field-testing. Yeast challenge material will 
establish “confidence” in the ability of the operator to operate the detection system in a 
field setting; however, true proficiency determinations may have to be conducted in a 
laboratory setting.113 Standards are under development by NIST that will establish the 
difference between traditional proficiency tests and the new confidence tests. 
                                                 
112 ASTM International. E2770-10: Standard Guide for Operational Guidelines, 6. 
113 Confidence test refers to the use of a safe alternative, such as yeast, to an attenuated select agent, 
such as the Sterne strain of anthrax. The use of an assay to detect an agent that the assay was not designed 
for means that results cannot be used to determine proficiency as commonly understood by certified 
laboratories. Instead, results indicate general confidence in end user competency and detector accuracy.  
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Another consequence of requiring a quality assurance program is the substantial 
logistical support that will be required to sustain it. A centralized logistical support 
program that maintains readiness will not be practical at the state level. Standardization 
of the quality assurance program will also require standardized logistics. DHS will need 
to oversee this program in order to ensure that participating states do not run out of 
approved supplies. The program can be outsourced to a commercial vendor who 
specializes in laboratory logistics.   
Choosing to use a state’s National Guard CST instead of developing local 
capability will leave states vulnerable during sample surge. CST teams provide unique 
capabilities to assist local authorities when they have a gap during response operations, 
but a CST should not replace or duplicate state capabilities. Emergency responders are 
the state’s first line response assets and should be supported by framework 
implementation. If states choose to rely on CST capability instead of developing their 
own emergency responders’ capability they may unintentionally undermine the efforts of 
local emergency agencies to modernize. Technology that was once the domain of the 
laboratory and specialized military units is now available to the emergency responder 
community and therefore should be supported by the five critical framework elements. 
The APHL survey results indicate some states are starting to adjust their plans and 
training to incorporate new technology. The consequences of not implementing a national 
framework mean federal and state governments run the risk of lagging behind the 
emergence of technology. 
D. RESEARCH SUMMARY 
The adoption of the framework is not complete, although some effort is currently 
underway. Implementation activities are best represented at the state level when they 
involve plans and guidance versus specific responder tasks such as training and 
exercising. Collaboration between the states’ public health LRN laboratories, their CST, 
and FBI WMD coordinators has been reported, indicating that standardization between 
these agencies is possible. Additional effort is needed in determining what components of 
the framework are acceptable at the state level. Future efforts should include establishing 
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an expert panel of state representatives in order to form a consensus on what practices 
best support implementation.  
A proposed framework modeled after the CST quality assurance program’s ISO 
17025 accreditation would significantly improve preparedness at the local level. The 
improved framework would:  
1. utilize detection technology to support on-site biological assessment and 
PSAA testing at point of sample,  
2. adapt the ConOp to use the technology to improve the hazard assessment 
process,  
3. strengthen the credibility and accuracy of results through a responder 
specific quality assurance program, and  
4. increase mission readiness through a centralized logistics program.  
These four improvements will increase local preparedness by improving the triage 
process that determines risk associated with a suspicious substance event.  
 45
V. CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The need for a national response framework is driven by the emergence of new 
technology and its incorporation into local response operations. The impact of innovative 
technology has the potential to disrupt unless it is fully supported by the critical elements 
of the biothreat response framework. Since 2001, the country has experienced a surge of 
suspicious substance events. The 2013 ricin mailings demonstrate that this trend is far 
from over.114 Local emergency responders such as police, fire fighters, emergency 
medical services, HAZMAT technicians, and bomb squads all need detection technology. 
Detection capability is needed to not only ensure responder safety but to also conduct 
field assessments in support of the hazard assessment and threat analysis process. In the 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) 2011 Chemical Biological Radiological 
Survey, 282 devices were reviewed with 198 being specific to biological detection.115 
The impact of technology promises increased capability, but technology can also lead to a 
false sense of capability if used inappropriately. Communities are now confronted with a 
complex array of technical questions regarding the availability of new detectors such as, 
“does this equipment work as described?”; “can we operate it correctly?”; and “what do I 
do with the results?” The five critical elements of the national Framework for a Biothreat 
and Response Mission Capability can be used to answer these questions. The five critical 
elements can also build confidence in results so the threat assessment and hazard analysis 
process can be better supported.116 
In the United States, the legislative authority granted to local governments varies 
by state, affecting how emergency response operations are conducted. In one community, 
a response may be led by public safety, and in another, that role maybe assigned to a law 
                                                 
114 “FBI Response to Reports of Suspicious Letters Received at Mail Facilities,” Federal Bureau of 
Investigation National Press Office, April 17, 2013, retrieved May 2, 2013, from 
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enforcement entity. The status of biothreat response at the community level is 
heterogeneous, with significant variation due to factors such as home rule,117 population, 
geography, funding, and urban sprawl. These factors set priorities and result in 
differences between communities. Implementing a national framework therefore must 
include local adaptation as well as national standards.  
The EMS system emerged in the late 1960s with state and local governments 
taking the lead in program development and system design.118 Like the EMS example, 
the bioresponse framework will emerge when state and local governments take the lead. 
The federal government will be responsible for key aspects of the framework, but the 
work of implementation—and the eventual quality assurance program and system 
design—will be created based on the needs and capabilities of local communities. The 
lesson learned from the EMS example is that at its core, response is local, so variation in 
system configurations is to be expected. Despite variation, robust standardization 
regarding the quality assurance program must be implemented if results are to be 
consistent and reliable.  
B. WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATE OF FRAMEWORK ADOPTION AT 
THE STATE LEVEL? 
It is difficult to assess the extent of framework adoption at the community level 
since implementation has been largely independent of federal support. The APHL survey 
indicates local public health laboratories have implemented some components of the 
framework, but more needs to be accomplished. Framework adoption is possible, given 
the collaboration findings that show public health laboratories have working relationships 
between their CST teams and FBI WMD coordinators. In order to comply with 
Presidential Policy Directive / PPD-8: National Preparedness,119 implementation 
                                                 
117 Kenneth Vanlandingham, “Municipal Home Rule in the United States,” William and Marry Law 
Review 10, no. 2 (1968): 269.  
118 Ellen MacKenzie and Anthony Carlini, Configurations of EMS Systems: A Pilot Study (Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, 2008), retrieved April 12, 2013, from 
http://www.ems.gov/pdf/810911.pdf.  
119 Department of Homeland Security, Presidential Policy Directive / PPD-8: National Preparedness 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2011), retrieved July 24, 2013, from 
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activities should be undertaken in conjunction with NGB CST program, CDC LRN, and 
the FBI. These agencies represent a common response element in every state and are a 
ready-made mechanism for national standardization. Additionally, more work is still 
needed to incorporate emergency responder coordination in training and planning. It is 
recommended that state governments and public laboratories reach out to their responder 
communities to develop framework adoption practices.  
State public health laboratories did indicate some activity regarding PSAA 
detection technology, while other laboratories indicated an interest to move in that 
direction. On-site biological assessment and PSAA testing in the field are becoming more 
prolific; there is a window of opportunity to establish the basis for a standardized quality 
assurance program before “next generation” detection becomes “today’s detection” 
technology. It is recommended that states survey their responder communities in order to 
measure the impact that new technology is having on the response ConOp. Findings 
should be used to adjust state response plans and training programs and justify a quality 
assurance program if one becomes necessary.  
In the absence of national training standards, almost half of the states surveyed 
indicated they are actively developing their own. Like the EMS example, training 
actively at the state level is an indication that states are capable of developing their own 
programs to include certification levels. Diversity in state training programs also 
indicates a clear need for national training guidance in order to support state program 
development. Additionally, PPD8 recognizes the need for national response capabilities 
and a coordinated national biothreat response training curricula is essential. A national 
curriculum would allow states to build off of their existing local capabilities and 
encourage state led training initiatives based on their unique jurisdictional needs. 
Additionally, national guidance and standards are not always adopted. This was 
observed with 58.8 percent of the states reporting that they use state developed sample 
screening protocols instead of the FBI, DHS, HHS/CDC coordinated document or the 
APHL Algorithm. Although this finding is limited to those who participated in the survey, 
it may indicate a need for DHS to communicate standards more effectively at the state 
level.  
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C. WHAT IS THE NATIONAL BIORESPONSE FRAMEWORK? 
A national bioresponse framework is defined by the five critical elements found in 
the Framework for a Biothreat and Response Mission Capability document.  Progress has 
been made in establishing each of the elements, but some gaps were identified requiring 
adoption of CST specific practices.  
A workable ConOp is defined in the mutually supporting framework documents. 
APHL describes the ConOp in the APHL Model Practice: Algorithm and Guidelines for 
Responding to an Incident Involving a Suspicious Non-Clinical Sample document,120 and 
DHS describes it in AST E2770-10 Standard Guide for Operational Guidelines for Initial 
Response to a Suspected Biothreat Agent.121 The documents are sufficient in scope and 
detail to allow local and state governments to incorporate the guidance into their plans 
and standard operation procedures (SOP). A state’s ConOp should take into account on-
site biological assessment and PSAA testing results. On-site biological assessment results 
can support the hazard assessment and threat analysis process in determining risk. Public 
safety actions based on on-site biological assessment results should only be used to make 
ascending and lateral safety decisions. For example, an on-site biological assessment 
result can identify the need to upgrade personal protection equipment (PPE) level 
(ascending) or justify changing the type of decontamination solution used during 
decontamination (lateral), but on-site biological assessment results cannot be used to 
lower PPE levels.  
In contrast, PSAA detection supports the threat assessment and hazard analysis 
process; in limited situations, results can be used to justify descending safety actions, 
such as reducing the level of PPE. On-site biological assessment and PSAA testing 
results can be used to support changes to the ICS site safety plan.122 PSAA (presumptive) 
results cannot be used to definitively identify a hazard or be used to advise medical 
                                                 
120 Association of Public Health Laboratories, Association of Public Health Laboratories Model, 2. 
121 ASTM International. E2770-10: Standard Guide for Operational Guidelines. 
122 Occupational Safety and Health Administration, “Site Safety and Control Plan,” Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration, retrieved July 12, 2013, from 
https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/ics/pdf/ics208.pdf. 
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treatment protocols. That level of testing is defined as public health actionable assay 
(PHAA) and is accomplished by an LRN member, such as the state’s public health 
laboratory.123 
Certified training programs have not been developed on a national level. Some 
work has been done at the state level, which indicates that states are capable of 
developing and administering statewide training. In addition, 45 percent of the 
participating states indicated in the APHL survey that they had a bioresponse training 
program. As with the EMS example, states will need to take national guidance and 
develop their own training programs that are specific to their unique situations. Training 
programs should include the use of technology, risk assessment process, sample handling, 
documentation and evidence preservation. For a detailed training program explanation 
refer to ASTM E2770-10 Section 7.124  
Georgia demonstrated a proficiency and competency evaluation exercise template 
during the Operation Vigilant Sample (OVS) exercise series. Two exercises were 
conducted in Georgia at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)125 and 
one was conducted at Fort Detrick’s Biological Agent Identification and 
Counterterrorism Training (BAIT)126 Center.127 OVS was the first documented 
laboratory specific field exercise using gamma-irradiated Bacillus anthracis spores to 
verify proficiency at all levels of screening and testing. The exercises were conducted in 
real time from initial recognition of a suspicious substance to the final LRN 
determination of collected samples. On-site biological assessment and PSAA testing 
results were used to support the threat assessment hazard analysis process, and final LRN 
results were used to confirm risk determination.  
                                                 
123 Department of Homeland Security, Framework for Biothreat Field Response Mission Capability, 
6. 
124 ASTM International. E2770-10: Standard Guide for Operational Guidelines, 6. 
125 Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. http://www.fletc.gov/ (accessed June 12, 2013) 
126 United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases, “Biological Agent 
Identification and Counter Terrorism Training,” United States Army Medical Research Institute for 
Infectious Diseases, retrieved June 12, 2013, from 
http://www.usamriid.army.mil/education/docs/BAIT_2013.pdf. 
127 Morrow et al., “Building a National Biothreat Response Capability,” 28 
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The exercises were conducted in collaboration with emergency responders, the 4th 
Civil Support Team, the FBI, and the state public health laboratory. The template is either 
a two-day exercise event that is flexible enough to tailor scenarios to meet the needs of 
any state. The OVS template provides a mechanism to meet the requirements of ASTM 
E2770-10 Section 8. Attenuated select agents, such as the gamma-irradiated B. anthracis 
spores, can be used to conduct proficiency tests, or S. cerevisiae can be used to conduct 
confidence tests. The level of quality assurance needed can be determined by the state in 
conjunction with the LRN.  
Sample collection and handling standards are defined in ASTM E2458-10: 
Standard Practices for Bulk Sample Collection and Swab Collection of Visible Powders 
Suspected of Being Biothreat Agents from Nonporous Surfaces128 and the CDC’s Surface 
Sampling Procedures for Bacillus Anthracis Spores from Smooth, Nonporous 
Surfaces.129 ASTM E2458-10 provides methods for bulk collection, while the CDC 
surface sampling procedures provide methods for trace collection. Other sample type 
methods such as liquid will need to be developed and validated. States can use their own 
sampling methods if validated methods are not available. 
Efforts to develop biothreat detection performance standards have evolved over 
the past decade. The largest consensus effort to date involves the establishment of the 
stakeholder panel on agent assays (SPADA) by AOAC International, with funding from 
DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T).130 SPADA, DHS S&T, and the 
National Strategy for CBRNE Standards ultimately set standards for detectors that can be 
purchased at the community level. Access to validated detectors with known performance 
standards will be an ongoing effort that demands federal oversight. Validated detection 
technology should support on-site biological assessment and PSAA testing. Every 
                                                 
128 ASTM International, E2458-10: Standard Practices for Bulk Sample Collection. 
129 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Surface Sampling Procedures for Bacillus Anthracis 
Spores from Smooth, Nonporous Surfaces (Atlanta, GA: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2010), retrieved, May 1, 2012, from http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/emres/surface-sampling-bacillus-
anthracis.html.  
130 Scott Coates, Sharon Brunelle, and Mattew Davenport, “Development of Standard Method 
Performance Requirements for Biological Threat Agent Detection Methods,” Journal of AOAC 
International 94, no. 4 (2011): 1328–1337. 
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emergency responder organization that handles unknown material suspected of being a 
biothreat hazard will need basic on-site biological assessment technology, but not every 
organization will need PSAA detection. Communities that need PSAA detection are ones 
that have established high risk through a consequence, threat, and vulnerability 
assessment.  
The cost of maintaining the equipment and the associated quality assurance 
program will make the technology prohibitive for the average community. PSAA 
detection platforms, such as PCR, can be regionally shared. The capability will not be 
needed often due to the low probability/high consequence nature of a biothreat event, but 
the capability should be available if needed. Regional capability can be structured similar 
to a state’s explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) unit.  
D. WHAT IS THE FRAMEWORK IMPLEMENTATION MODEL?  
Implementation should occur in three phases in accordance with ASTM E2770-10 
Sections 6, Plans, 7, Training, and 8, Competency Assessment Exercises.131 Once 
implemented, the phases are cyclic and support the FEMA Preparedness Cycle: Train, 
Exercise, Evaluate/Improve, and Organize/Equip.132 During implementation community, 
state, and federal responsibilities are assigned. Federally resourced agencies such as the 
CST, FBI, and CDC LRN will work with state and community level agencies throughout 
all three phases of implementation. The CST, FBI WMD coordinators and CDC LRN 
member laboratories are common to each state and are standardized. These agencies 
represent the core resources needed to implement a national framework at the community 
level. DHS will work with the CDC, FBI, and NGB to identify target states for 
implementation. States that voluntarily agree will need to identify participating agencies, 
locate training and exercise venues, and be willing to have their state plans and guidance 
documents reviewed at the end of the process in order to determine what elements of the 
framework were accepted or rejected.  
                                                 
131 ASTM International. E2770-10: Standard Guide for Operational Guidelines, 5–6. 
132 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness Cycle. 
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In phase I, training certification, state governments will incorporate federal 
guidance into their state specific training programs. Federally resourced agencies, CST, 
FBI, and the CDC LRN, will work at the state level to prepare the emergency responders 
identified for participation in phase II. The state agencies will be provided the basic 
information and outlines needed to conduct future training. This effort is best described 
as a “train-the-trainer,” and it is intended to seed the community with the knowledge 
needed to create state specific training programs. The community and state agencies 
identified for implementation will receive training from the federally resourced agencies 
so that they are prepared to participate throughout the entire implementation process.  
In addition, it is recommended that the FBI and CDC use the Criminal and 
Epidemiological Investigation Handbook,133 ASTM E2770-10, and the APHL algorithm 
to assist states in developing their certified training programs. The FBI and CDC can 
facilitate the development of state curriculum that includes framework response ConOp, 
and the threat assessment and hazard analysis process. It is recommended that the CST, in 
collaboration with NIST and NIOSH, use the Coordinated FBI-DHS-HHS/CDC 
document, ASTM E2458-10, and the CDC surface sampling procedures to support 
training development. The CST can assist in training emergency responders on on-site 
biological assessment (i.e., screening) and sample collection. Local communities will be 
required to know and operate their specific detection technologies. At the end of phase I, 
participants should be able to: 
 Conduct sample screening and hazard assessment in accordance with 
ASTM E2770 and coordinated FBI-DHS-HHS/CDC document 
 Conduct sampling operations in accordance with ASTM E2458-10 and the 
CDC surface sampling procedures when deemed appropriate  
 Know the response ConOp in accordance with the APHL Algorithm and 
ASTM E2770-10 
In phase II, competency and proficiency evaluation exercises, the CST will host a 
statewide full-scale bioresponse exercise in collaboration with the public health 
laboratory (LRN member) and the FBI WMD coordinator. Trained state and community 
                                                 
133 Federal Bureau of Investigation and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Criminal and 
Epidemiological Investigation Handbook: 2011 Edition, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2011. 
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agencies from phase I will be required to respond in real time to a suspicious mailing and 
will conduct operations in accordance with their SOP and the framework ConOp. The 
state government in conjunction with the state public health laboratory will determine if 
they need to conduct proficiency (attenuated select agents) or confidence testing (yeast). 
The CDC LRN will supply proficiency challenge material; it is strongly recommended 
that an appropriate risk analysis be conducted to ensure proper controls are in place to 
reduce the possibility of unintentional contamination. Currently, confidence challenge 
material is supplied by NIST in limited quantity. It is recommended that DHS work the 
Critical Reagents Program (CRP)134 to supply yeast assays for future implementation 
programs.  
Furthermore, it is recommended that states undergoing phase II utilize the 
Georgia OVS exercise template. OVS is a two-day exercise. Day one is focused on 
responding to a suspicious mailing with bulk powder, and day two is designed to exercise 
a contamination response with trace sample collection. The scenario is designed to meet 
credible threat and emergency responders are required to collect bulk powder in 
accordance with ASTM E2458-10. After an on-site biological assessment, an FBI led 
hazard assessment and threat evaluation determines credible threat and the need to collect 
a sample. Sample collection is split samples at point of sample (methods A and B). 
Method A samples are sent to the state’s public health laboratory for final determination; 
method B samples are tested by emergency responders if they have PSAA detection 
capability and by the CST mobile ALS laboratory. Day one ends when on-site results are 
known and the public health laboratory results can be incorporated during day two. Day 
two expands the response with a confirmed identification of a select agent. Sampling 
operations to determine the extent of contamination will be conducted using the CDC 
surface sampling procedures. On-site results can be used to update the hazard assessment 
and threat analysis process. At the end of phase II participants will be evaluated on: 
 
                                                 
134 Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense, “Critical Reagents 
Program,” last modified July 17, 2013, Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological 
Defense, retrieved August, 12, 2013, http://www.jpeocbd.osd.mil/packs/Default.aspx?pg=1205.  
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 Competency in response ConOp, hazard assessment and threat analysis, 
and sample collection 
 Confidence (if yeast is used) in on-site biological assessment and PSAA 
analysis  
 Proficiency (if attenuated select agents are used) in PSAA and PHAA  
In phase III, plans, an after action review (AAR) is conducted with all 
participating agencies in order to define what worked and what did not. AAR comments 
will be used to develop a “lessons learned” statement in order to identify best practices 
for updating state plans and guidance. Additionally, it is recommended that competency 
and proficiency results should be used to verify certification levels assigned during 
training. Upon conclusion of the AAR process, it is recommended that DHS review state 
plans to determine what was adopted and what was rejected. The three-phased 
implementation process should then be conducted again on an annual basis with other 
state emergency responders independently from federal support. Upon conclusion of 
Phase III participating agencies should be able to identify: 
 Best practices 
 Rejected practices  
 Certified responders 
E. FUTURE RESEARCH 
It is recommended that additional research continue on the subject of 
implementation and community preparedness. While this research was extensive, it is by 
no means complete. Recommended areas for future research include, conducting a Delphi 
panel survey135 of the states represented in the APHL survey. A Delphi panel is made of 
up experts from the bioresponse field, and the participating state BT coordinators 
demonstrated knowledge of the current state of implementation at the community level. 
A Delphi panel should seek to identify best practices and barriers to implementation in 
the areas of: 
                                                 
135 The Delphi method is a structured communication process between participants who have expert 
insight into a field of study. Panel member responses are kept anonymous in order to facilitate open debate. 
The Delphi process is steered by an administrator who ensures exchanges stay focused and move towards 
consensus and agreement 
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 Certified training standards 
 PSAA and Characterization technology   
 Quality assurance program (to include logistics)  
 Results integration into the ConOp 
Additional research should also be conducted in measuring the impact of 
implementation to community preparedness. Metrics to measure preparedness indicators 
for each of the three phases have not been developed. Continual investment into the three 
phases of implementation (i.e., FEMA preparedness cycle, will require justification). 
Quantifiable differences in preparedness indicators, such as an increase in certified PSAA 
level technicians, will be provide compelling arguments for continued investment.  
F. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is recommended that a national quality assurance program be undertaken based 
on the lessons learned from the CST program. It is also recommended that the hosting 
agency start conversations with the NGB CST program in order to assess the feasibility 
of this concept. A quality assurance program is needed to ensure that PSAA results are 
reliable. It is observed in the APHL survey that states are acquiring next generation 
detection technology such as PCR platforms. The window for standardization will close 
if a quality assurance program is not implemented before this trend becomes established. 
If a national quality assurance program does not occur, states will most likely develop 
their own, resulting in signification variation. Variation in quality assurance will 
undermine the hazard assessment and threat evaluation process.    
It is recommended that current and future detection technologies be reviewed to 
determine their suitability for supporting the hazard assessment process during 
characterization screening before sample collection. Characterization screening is a 
component of on-site biological assessment and should be used primarily for bulk sample 
incidents where the impact of sample consumption is minimal. It is recommended that 
characterization screening be completed during safety screening so that the results can be 
used to enhance the hazard assessment, determine sample collection points, and support 
any PSAA testing strategies. Because of the potential for false negatives, characterization 
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screening results should only be integrated into the ConOp in the absence of PSAA and 
PHAA results. Furthermore, screening results should only be used to elevate risk, not 
lower it. Jurisdictions choosing to integrate sample characterization into their on-scene 
biological assessment should ensure that personnel and test methods are supported by 
training and proficiency testing programs defined in ASTM E2770-10.136 
It is recommended that a central logistics program take on the responsibility of 
supporting communities with a need for PSAA capability. Logistics can affect the quality 
of results and are a major component to any quality assurance program. Logistics must be 
standardized if results are required to be standardized. It is recommended that support be 
awarded to communities that have an established capability need as determined through a 
comprehensive risk analysis such as threat, vulnerability, and consequence (TVC).137  
Finally, it is recommended that the three-phased implementation strategy be used 
as a template to quantitatively measure preparedness. Metrics that measure framework 
adoption in certified training and plans should be developed. Metrics could include the 
number of certified responders relative to communities’ population, and the adoption 
level of national standards represented in state plans. Additionally, the competency and 
proficiency evaluation exercises are an opportunity to measure a community’s actual 
response capabilities.  
G. SUMMARY  
Implementing a national biothreat response framework began with the 
publications of GAO-05-251, Agencies Need to Validate Sampling Activities in Order to 
Increase Confidence in Negative Results and GAO-08-180, First Responders’ Ability to 
Detect and Model Hazardous Releases in Urban Areas is Significantly Limited. NGB 
supported this process with the validation of a sample collection method ASTM E2458-
                                                 
136 ASTM International. E2770-10: Standard Guide for Operational Guidelines, 8. 
137 United States Government Accountability Office, DHS Risk-Based Grant is Reasonable, But 
Current Version’s Measure of Vulnerability is Limited (GAO-08-852), (Washington, DC: United States 
Government Accountability Office, 2008), retrieved July 21, 2013, from 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/277552.pdf. 
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10.138 The publication of a validated sample collection method accomplished the first 
critical element in the national framework.139 The National Guard Civil Support Team 
program has supported the development of the framework from the start and should 
continue its support during implementation. Planning for fiscal year 2014 implementation 
exercises using the OVS template are underway. It is the intent of this research that the 






                                                 
138 Locascio, “Department of Homeland Security and Committee E54;” Harper and Robinson, 
Method, Modification (2004.08). 
139 Department of Homeland Security, Framework for Biothreat Field Response Mission Capability, 
4. 
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